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In the Matter of the 
Estate of 
HARVARD L. WHEADON, 
Deceased. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 15329 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case arises under the provisions of Utah's Lost Will 
Statute, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 75-3-26 (1953), and involves the 
issue of whether a lost will may be admitted to probate upon proof of 
its legal existence (non-revocation) or whether proof of its actual, 
physical existence at the time of the testator's death is required. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury; however, the lower court took 
the case from the jury upon objectors'-respondents' Motion for a Directed 
Verdict. The lower court held that a lost will may not be admitted to 
probate merely upon proof of due execution, content and non-revocation. 
The court stated that before a lost will can be admitted to probate, it 
must be shown to have been in actual, physical existence at the time of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the testator's death. Since physical existence was not shown, the court 
refused to admit the lost will to probate. 
The_petitioners-appellants moved the court for a directed 
verdict upon the ground that the due execution, contents and non-revo-
cation of the lost will had been established by unrefuted evidence, and 
that it should be admitted to probate as a matter of law. This motion 
was denied by the lower court. 
Petitioners-appellants moved the court for a new trial, pur-
suant to Rule 58, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and said motion was 
also denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioners-appellants seek reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in their favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
-la-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The decedent, Harvard L. Wheadon, an unmarried man, died on 
April 14, 1976 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, leaving real and 
personal property situate in said County and State. 
On May 24, 1955, decedent duly executed a will (a conformed 
copy of which was introduced at trial; the contents of which are uncon-
troverted) leaving all his property, both personal and real, to his 
brother, Melvin S. Wheadon. The will gave nothing to his other brothers 
and sister, objectors and respondents herein. (Transcript 1-18; Exhibit 
1-P) 
In addition, the will named said Melvin S. Wheadon as the 
executor of the estate. (Transcript 1-21) Melvin S. Wheadon died on 
February 4, 1971, leaving two daughters, Ellen Wheadon Piercey and Iris 
Wheadon Jensen, petitioners and appellants herein. (Transcript 2-36, 
2-45) Within 15 days of Melvin S. Wheadon's death, the decedent, 
Harvard L. Wheadon, executed a codicil to his last will and testament, 
whereby he changed his will to provide that Judy Burton and Sue Bateman 
should serve as the co-executrices of his estate. (Exhibit 2-P; Transcript 
2-3) All other provisions of the will remained unaltered thus providing 
that his entire estate should go to the estate of his then-deceased 
brother, Melvin S. Wheadon. (Exhibits 1-P, 2-P) 
The original will has not yet been located and it is not known 
whether decedent ever had possession of the document. No one ever saw 
it in his possession. Neither Mr. Everett Dahl, decedent's attorney, 
nor Mr. Dahl's former secretary, Ann Dahl, ever remembers having given 
-2-
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the document to the decedent. (Transcript 1-23, 24) Evidence showed 
merely that on occasion, Mr. Dahl would give the original document to 
the testator. (Transcript 1-23) Mr. Dahl testified that, in 1955, it 
was his practice, if asked by the client, to keep the original document. 
(Transcript 1-23, 2-27) He did not recall whether he kept the executed 
will or not. (Transcript 1-23) Nine years after the will was executed, 
Mr. Dahl and his partner separated and each took his own clients' 
documents. (Transcript 2-5) At this same time, an inventory was made 
of the wills Mr. Dahl had in his possession. (Transcript 2-5) That 
inventory showed that Mr. Dahl did not have the decedent's will in his 
possession. (Transcript 1-24; 2-6) Mr. Dahl also testified that it was 
his practice in 1955 to give a copy of the original will to the client. 
(Transcript 1-23). Shortly after the decedent's death, Mr. Dahl and his 
staff made a diligent search of his office and his files in order to 
locate the original will. Neither the will nor a copy of it was found 
as a result of this search. (Transcript 2-9; 2-12) However, on the day 
of trial, Mr. Dahl made another search for the missing will. At that 
time, he discovered the unexecuted copy of the will in his files, even 
though his prior diligence in searching had failed to locate it. 
(Transcript 2-11) 
In 1971, when decedent executed his codicil, he insisted that 
Mr. Dahl retain the original document. (Transcript 2-7) Mr. Dahl did 
retain that document and it has been submitted for probate. 
Mr. Wheadon, decedent, was a man possessed of a great aware-
ness of the need for a will. (Transcript 3-4, 3-35) To his close 
-3-
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friends he indicated on a number of occasions that his affairs were in 
order and that all was taken care of, and that they too should get 
their affairs in order. (Transcript 3-3, Transcript 3-4, Transcript 
3-5, Transcript 3-38) To one of his closest friends, Judy Burton, he 
stated several months before his demise that he had a will. (Transcript 
3-2) The background for that statement was a discussion between the two 
of them shortly after Judy's step-father had died intestate, causing 
confusion to the surviving members of the family. (Transcript 2-49, 3-2) 
Additionally, on- the way to the hospital a few days prior to 
decedent's death, a newscaster on the radio reported the imbroglio sur-
rounding the purported Howard Hughes will. (Transcript 3-3, 3-4) Again 
on that occasion, decedent told Judy Burton of his awareness of the 
importance of a will. (Transcript 3-4) 
To Ray and Joyce Shepard, currently living in Oklahoma, 
decedent indicated that he had a will and that his affairs were in 
order. (Record 230) 
A day or two after decedent's death, Bertha Tilbury and John 
Wheadon, along with Bertha's daughter, Helen Somer, asked Ray and Joyce 
Shepard (decedent's next-door neighbors, with whom he had left his keys) 
for the keys to the decedent's house for the purpose of obtaining a suit 
in which to bury decedent. (Transcript 3-62) At the time, Grant Palmer, 
a friend of the Shepards, was visiting at their house. (Record 227) 
By affidavit, the Shepards stated that Bertha, John and Helen 
went to the house in company with Ray and Joyce Shepard and Grant Palmer. 
(Record 230-231) Once inside, Bertha and Helen went directly to the 
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cupboard where decedent was known to have kept some of his personal 
papers. (Record 230-231) The Shepards did not see what documents Bertha I 
I 
and Helen were handling. Nor did the Sh.epards see what documents, if any, 
were taken. Since the Shepards and Grant Palmer had gone to the house 
to get the Shepards' fish tanks and guns, those three left as soon as 
they had obtained their personal property. (Record 227, 230-231) 
Grant Palmer, by affidavit, a copy of which is included in 
the record, stated under oath that by the time he and the Shepards 
arrived at decedent's home, John, Bertha and Helen were already inside. 
(Record 227) He observed that by the time he arrived, Bertha and 
Helen had taken decedent's personal papers from the cupboard, had 
them on the kitchen table, and were looking through them. (Record 
227) When he and the Shepards left with the guns and fish tanks, the 
others remained behind. (Record 227) Mr. Palmer did not see any of 
the three outside the home until some 30 minutes later, when he ob-
served Bertha come from the direction of the decedent's home and 
enter her own home. (Record 227) 
Contrary to the affidavits of disinterested parties, Bertha 
testified at trial that she was not in the home at any time when the 
Shepards and Mr. Palmer were not present. (Transcript 3-71, 3-72, 
Record 227) She also testified that she did not handle the papers and 
documents in the cupboard. (Transcript 3-71, 3-72) 
Helen also testified that she was not in the house at any 
time when the Shepards and Mr. Palmer were not present. (Transcript 
-5- i 
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3-76) Initially she also testified that she had never handled any of 
the documents or even opened the cupboard. However, upon being pressed 
on the matter, she finally admitted that the cupboard had been opened, 
but added, 11 Just a 1 ittl e. 11 (Transcript 3-76) 
Despite the testimony of Bertha and Helen, John testified that 
he was never in the house at the time in question. (Transcript 3-63) 
His testimony is also contradicted by that of Mr. Palmer and Mr. and 
Mrs. Shepard. (Record 227) 
It was petitioners' intention to have Ray and Joyce Shepard 
testify at the trial; they had indicated that they would. Petitioners 
were providing the Shepards with plane tickets to Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and were making hotel accommodations for their stay--all at petitioners' 
expense. Because the Shepards lived in Oklahoma, they were beyond the 
subpoena powers of the Court. Despite that fact, as noted, the Shepards 
had agreed to voluntarily come to testify. However, within a matter of 
days, including a weekend, before the trial, the Shepards wavered in 
their willingness to testify, until finally just before trial, they 
refused to make an appearance. This was due to the illness of Mrs. 
Shepard at the time of trial and the fact that her brother-in-law had 
become critically ill. 
Because of preparation for the trial, including drafting of 
petitioners' trial memorandum and jury instructions, and further pre-
paration of petitioners' case-in-chief, petitioners' attorneys did not 
locate Grant Palmer for the purpose of finding out what he knew about 
-6-
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the incident. Petitioners' attorneys had never contacted Grant Palmer 
prior to trial, and his connection with the case seemed peripheral at 
best. It was only when the Shepards failed to appear and Bertha and 
Helen testified inconsistently as to the incident, that the importance 
of Mr. Palmer's knowledge became more apparent. 
Objectors Tilbury and Wheadon were granted nothing by the will 
and thus would receive no property if the will were probated. If the 
decedent were found to have died intestate, they would each receive one-
fourth of the estate. 
At the close of petitioners' case-in-chief, both petitioners 
and objectors Tilbury and Wheadon moved for a directed verdict. Both 
motions were denied. (Transcript 3-41, 3-55) 
At the conclusion of objectors' case, both petitioners and 
objectors moved again for a directed verdict. (Transcript 3-78, 79) 
Petitioners' motion was denied. (Transcript 3-79) Objectors' motion 
was granted on the ground that, as used in Section 75-3-26, U.C.A., the 
phrase "in existence" means actual, physical existence of the paper. 
(Transcript 3-80) While it was never proved that the will was not in 
actual physical existence, the Court held that the will's physical 
existence at the moment of the testator's death must be proved, and 
since it could not be proved it was not in physical existence at the 
pertinent moment, and thus the will was not entitled to be probated. 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
The law in effect at the time of the decedent's death, and 
therefore the law which governs this case is contained in Section 75-3-
26, Utah Code Annotated. That section provides: 
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will, unless the 
same is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death 
of the testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently destroyed in 
the lifetime of the testator, nor unless its provisions are clearly 
and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is petitioners'-appellants' contention that ''in existence", 
as used in this section, simply means legal existence, i.e., unrevoked. 
On the other hand, objectors-respondents claim that ''in existence" means 
actual physical existence. While no Utah case has decided the issue, 
the judge at the trial indicated that most courts had interpreted the 
phrase to mean actual physical existence. Even though the will has 
never been shown not to exist, the trial court held that since its 
physical existence at the moment of testator's death was not shown, the 
will was inadmissible to probate. Petitioners-appellants contend that 
such a construction was erroneous, that legal existence is all that is 
required to carry out the purpose and intent of the statutes, and there-
fore they are entitled to a judgment in their favor as a matter of law. 
POINT I. 
THAT LEGAL EXISTENCE IS SUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH CASE LAW TO 
SATISFY THE INTENT OF SECTION 75-3-36, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
While not dealing specifically with the issue of legal ~ ~ 
~physical existence, the only Utah case dealing with Section 75-3-26, 
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U.C.A. is In re Frandsen's Will, 50 Utah 156, 167 P. 362 (1917). In 
that case, the testatrix had executed a will in 1900. She executed two 
other wills later: One in 1911 and another in 1912. The latter two 
wills had been executed at a time when the testatrix was found to lack 
sufficient mental capacity, and therefore they were denied probate. The 
case then involved only the admissibility to probate of the will of 
1900. That will had been duly executed and was recorded in the County 
Clerk's office. On July 5, 1911, testatrix was found and declared to~ 
insane. The will was last seen in March, 1912--some three years prior 
to her death in 1915. The court faced the issue then of whether or not 
the will was in existence at testatrix' death. But rather than decide 
what "in existence" meant, the court based its decision on what "death" 
meant. In construing the statute, the court stated as the section's 
purpose, . to prevent spurious wil 1 s from being proved." Frandsen, , 
supra at 364. And further: 
[I]f the whole purpose of the statute can be subserved, the court 
in furtherance of justice, may well give its provisions a fair and 
even a liberal construction rather than a narrow and strict one, 
when to do that would be unfair and unjust. (Frandsen, supra at 
364.) 
The court then proceeded to give the term "death" as used in 
the statute, a fair and reasonable interpretation. Rather than hold 
that "death" meant physical death, the court held that "death" meant 
legal or mental death, that is, loss of sufficient mental capacity 
either to make or revoke a will. 
While she [testatrix] continued to live physically, she, however, 
was as much dead mentally for the purpose of making a will as she 
now is . . . When it is once shown that a testator is bereft of 
-9-
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the power either to change or to revoke an existing will, it is 
further shown, as here, that the will existed long after the power 
to revoke passed from the testator, then such a will fairly comes 
within the provisions of Section [75-3-26] and should be admitted 
to probate the same as though the testator had physically died. 
(Frandsen, supra at 365.) 
The court thus drew a distinction between physical and legal 
death in order to reach a fair and just result. In the instant case, 
where it was conclusively shown that the will was unrevoked and there-
fore in legal existence, there is ample reason to comply with the mandate 
of the Frandsen decision, by construing the section liberally and 
fairly, and hold that legal existence sufficiently subserves the purpose 
of the section. To hold, as the trial court held, in limiting the 
statute to require physical existence, is to construe the statute 
narrowly and strictly with an unfair and unjust result. 
POINT II. 
THAT A REQUIREMENT OF PHYSICAL EXISTENCE CONTRADICTS THE 
CLEAR INTENT OF SECTION 74-1-19, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
The Code is explicit on the ways in which wills may be revoked. 
And by the very language of the statute, the ways prescribed thereunder 
are exclusive. Section 74-1-19, U.C.A. states: 
Except in cases in this chapter mentioned, no written will, nor any 
part thereof, can be revoked or altered otherwise than: 
(1) By a written will or other writing of the testator de-
claring such revocation or alteration executed with the same 
formalities with which a will should be executed by such testator; 
or 
(2) By being burned, torn, cancelled, obliterated or des-
troyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the same, 
by the testator himself, or by some person in his presence and by 
his direction. 
-10-
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As seen from the language of that section, there are two 
physical ways of revoking a will: (1) By making a second will and (2) 
by destroying the will with the intent and purpose of revoking the same. 
The other ways provided by "except in the cases in this chapter mentioned" 
are by operation of law. Section 74-1-24, 1 U.C.A. provides for the 
revocation of a will in the case where the testator marries and has 
children after having executed a will. Section 74-1-25,2 U.C.A. pro-
vides for the revocation of a testator's will where the testator marries 
after making his will. Section 74-1-31,3 U.C.A. provides for the revo-
74-1-24. Effect of marriage and issue after making will. If after 
making a will the testator marries and has issue of such marriage born 
either in his lifetime or after his death, and the wife or issue survives 
him, the will is conclusively presumed to be revoked, unless provision 
is made for such issue by some settlement, or unless such issue is pro-
vided for in the will, or in such way mentioned therein as to show an 
intention not to make such provision; and no evidence of other facts to 
rebut the presumption of such revocation can be received. 
2 74-1-25. Effect of marriage, if wife survives. If after making a 
will the testator marries and the wife survives him, the will is con-
clusively presumed to be revoked, unless provision has been made for her 
either by marriage contract, or by some written settlement showing on 
its face the testator's intention to substitute such contract or settle-
ment for a provision in her favor in his will, or unless she is provided 
for in the will or in such way mention therein as to show an intention 
not to make such provision; and no evidence of other facts to rebut the 
presumption of revocation can be received. 
3 74-1-31. Child born after making will. Whenever a testator has a 
child born either in his lifetime or after his death, or adopted, after 
the making of his will, and dies leaving such child unprovided for by 
any settlement, and neither provided for nor in any way mentioned in 
his will, the child succeeds to the same portion of the testator's real 
and personal property that he would have succeeded to if the testator 
had died intestate. 
-11-
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cation, pro tanto, of a will in the case where a child is born to the 
testator after execution of the will. Section 74-1-32, 4 U.C.A. provides 
for the revocation of a will in the case of a pretermitted heir. As 
noted, the four exceptions to Section 74-1-19, U.C.A. are all by opera-
tion of law. -The legal statutory scheme then for revocation of wills is 
clear: Unless the will is revoked by operation of law, a will may be 
revoked only by a subsequent will, or by destruction with intent to 
revoke. Loss of a will clearly does not revoke the will under Utah law. 
Except in the operation-of-law cases, two elements must be 
shown to prove an effective revocation: (1) A physical act--either 
making a new will or destroying the old one; and (2) intent to revoke. 
In the case of a subsequent will, the act and intent are apparent from 
the will itself. In the case of a destroyed will, however, mere des-
truction does not necessarily evince an intent to revoke. If the will 
is accidentally or mistakenly destroyed, since there is no intent, there 
is no revocation; for under Section 74-1-19, U.C.A. the intent element 
is explicit and essential. "With the intent and for the purpose of 
revoking the same." (Emphasis added.) Thus, absent the requisite 
intent, there is no revocation. Loss of a will may create a presumption 
of revocation, but such presumption is clearly overcome by contrary 
statements from the testator. 
4 74-1-32. Failure to provide for child or child's issue. When any 
testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, natural 
or adopted, or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it appears 
that such omission was intentional, such child or the issue of such 
child has the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had 
died intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in the preceeding 
section. 
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What is the effect of Section 75-3-26, U.C.A. upon statutory 
scheme outlining the exclusive means for revocation of a will? Section 
75-3-26, U.C.A. requires that the will must be shown to be "in existence" 
at the testator's death. If the will were accidentally or mistakenly 
destroyed by testator during his lifetime, but without the intent to 
revoke, under Section 75-1-19, U.C.A. it is still a valid will and has 
not been revoked, and should be legally operative. But if "in existence" 
means physical existence, since the paper is no longer in existence, the 
will cannot be probated. Thus, the result is that an unrevoked will, 
one which disposes of the testator's property as he wanted and intended, 
and one which he intended to be effective as a will, cannot be probated. 
Such a result abrogates the intent of the testator and is, thus, absurd, 
unfair, unjust, and it does not subserve the purpose of the statute as 
outlined in Frandsen, and also contradicts the liberal construction 
demanded by Frandsen. 
The New York Court of Appeals, in In re Fox Will, 174 N.E.2d 
499 (N.Y. 1961), construed their lost will statute which is almost 
identical to Utah's. In that case, the will had actually been physically 1 
destroyed. Later the testator, on learning of its destruction, "orally 
adopted" the destruction. The court stated: 
However sophisticated the reasoning may appear, to speak of a 
destroyed will which is valid and unrevoked but which may not be 
admitted to probate is legal sophistry unless the refusal to admit 
it is based on reasonable doubt as to whether the will was really 
the testator's will . . . Here, there is no doubt whatsoever that 
the will offered for probate was the testator's will. Nor is the~ 
-13-
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any question that it was not revoked with the formality required by 
law. There is, under these circumstances, no reason for denyin 
it probate. Fox, supra at 505 emphasis added 
In the instant case, there was no evidence presented at trial 
that the will was destroyed; objectors and respondents relied totally 
upon an inference of destruction, since the will could not be found. 
This apparent conflict between the two Code sections is obviated by 
construing "in existence" to mean legal existence. The result is that 
since there is no intent to revoke, there is no revocation, the will 
continues to exist legally, fairly fits within the ambit of Section 75-
3-26, U.C.A. and thus is admissible to probate. The evidence adduced at 
trial showed indisputably that the testator had no intent to revoke his 
will. He told Lawrence Leak that he, Howard L. Wheadon, had his affairs 
in order and that Mr. Leak should get his affairs in order. Decedent 
told Darlene Oakeson shortly before his death that his affairs were in 
order. To Judy Burton, decedent on at least two occasions, said he had 
a will and that his affairs were in order. 
The statements to Judy Burton and Darlene Oakeson all occurred 
in the context of a discussion about someone who had died not having his 
affairs in order, i.e., dying intestate. When Darlene's step-father-in-
law had died intestate, the family was left in a state of uncertainty 
and confusion. When decedent and Darlene talked about the situation, 
decedent then indicated he had his affairs in order. 
-14-
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The first time decedent told Judy Burton he had a will was 
about the same time he had the above discussion with Darlene. Decedent 
and Judy were talking about the death of Judy's step-father who had died 
intestate. At that time, Judy asked him directly whether he had a will. 
Emphatically, decedent said he did. 
The other occasion occurred when a radio newscaster reported 
the dispute surrounding Howard Hughes' estate. Again decedent indicated 
to Judy that he had a will. 
As was shown at trial, the decedent was acutely aware of the 
importance of having a will. And he was very much aware of the contents 
of his will. Within 15 days of the death of his appointed executor, 
decedent executed a codicil changing the executor of his estate. 
In contrast, there was not a scintilla of evidence indicating 
a desire on the part of decedent to revoke or modify his will. Never 
did decedent express dissatisfaction with the will or its provisions. 
From the date it was written in 1955, until 1971, the will remained 
unchanged. Only when the executor died was the will changed, and that 
change was solely to replace executors. The fact that decedent went 
back to his lawyer to effect the change indicates that he felt the need 
for legal assistance when dealing with changes in his testamentary 
plans. There was no evidence that he ever consulted an attorney to 
change his beneficiary or revoke his will. 
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POINT III. 
THAT A REQUIREMENT OF PHYSICAL EXISTENCE TURNS THE 
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION INTO A CONCLUSIVE 
PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION. 
The general rule is that where a will was last known to be in 
testator's possession, and cannot be found after his death, the will is 
presumed to have been destroyed with the intent to revoke. Garrett 
v. Butler, 317 S.W.2d 283 (Ark. 1958); In re Fox Will, 174 N.E.2d 499 
(N.Y. 1961); In re Morgan Estate, 59 N.E.2d 800. But it has just as 
uniformly been held that the presumption is rebuttable. In re Frandsen's 
Will, 176 P. 362, 365 (1917); Garrett v. Butler, 317 S.W.2d 283 (Ark. 
1958); In re Findley's Estate, 93 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1939); Hoff v. 
Armbruster, 226 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1950). 
If, however, Section 75-3-26 is construed to require "physical 
existence", then while the presumption may be rebutted, the will still 
cannot be probated because the paper may no longer be in existence. The 
upshot is that the rebuttable presumption becomes conclusive. Such 
a result is unfair and unjust, and would entirely thwart the desires and 
intentions of the testator. Frandsen clearly holds that the purpose of 
the lost will statute is to avoid this result. 
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POINT IV. 
THAT MERE FAILURE TO LOCATE A WILL DOES NOT MEAN THAT 
THE TESTATOR DESTROYED THE WILL WITH THE INTENT TO REVOKE. 
Just because the will has not been found, doesn't mean it 
has been destroyed. As noted, subsequent to testator's death, a dili-
gent but unfruitful search was made of the house and his safe deposit 
box, with the result that only a copy of his codicil was found in his 
safe deposit box. Also, decedent's attorney, Everett Dahl, made an 
exhaustive search through his own files, but found only the original 
codicil and a conformed copy of the will. On the day of the trial, 
Everett Dahl, checking through his files one final time to insure that 
he did not have the will, found the third copy of the v1ill--the copy 
that Dahl would normally have given to the testator to retain. Dahl 
could not explain why he had that copy, nor why he had not been able to 
locate it earlier. 
At trial it was shown that Mr. Dahl could not locate the 
original will. This, however, does not establish that he did not 
keep it in 1955 or that it had not been in his possession. The in-
ference that Mr. Dahl had the will is strengthened by the fact that 
after testator executed the codicil, he insisted that Mr. Dahl retain 
the original copy of that document .. Testator may have asked Mr. Dahl to 
keep the original will just as he asked him to keep the original 
codicil. 
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The only evidence which even intimates that the testator had 
the original will are: (l) Dahl's practice at the time to give the 
original will to the testator, and (2) the inventory sheet showing that 
Dahl didn't have the original. With respect to number (1), Dahl also 
stated he would have retained the original had he been asked. Decedent 
asked him to keep the original codicil, just as he may have asked him to 
keep the original will. With respect to the inventory, it was taken 
nine years after the will was executed. Within that nine-year period, 
the will may well have been misplaced or lost. In that case, testator 
never had the document and there is no presumption of revocation. Thus, 
the will ~ in existence; it just cannot be found. In In re Morgan's Estate, 
59 N.E.2d 800 (Ill. 1945), the will could not be found, but the evidence 
indicated testator had not revoked it. The court, at p. 801, said: 
[I]t is not necessary that the court be able to determine what 
happened to a will if there is evidence that indicates it was not 
revoked or cancelled by the testator. 
In In re Auritt's Estate, 27 P.2d 713 (Wash. 1933), the will could not 
be located, but as here, the evidence showed that the will had not been 
revoked. At p. 716, the court said: 
From a reading of the record, we can come to no other conclusion 
than that arrived at by the trial court, namely, that Rosa Auritt 
never revoked her will, but that it was in existence, somewhere, at 
the time of her death. (Emphasis added.) 
In In re Moramarco's Estate, 184 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1948), the will was not 
found, but it was found to be unrevoked. The California Supreme Court 
said at p. 746: 
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If there is no evidence pointing toward destruction of the will, 
other than the presumption previously mentioned, and there is 
circumstantial evidence of substance tending to prove that it was 
not destroyed, we are satisfied that the court may properly find 
that it was in existence at the testator's death. Certainly, 
we may not hold, as a matter of law, that proof that a will cannot 
be found is also proof that it has been destroyed. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
Finally, in In re Hoffman's Estate, 290 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1955), 
on facts similar to those in the instant case, the court held at p. 673: 
It is not known what happened to the original, executed drafts of 
the will and first codicil, but the record affords substantial 
evidence in support of the trial court's finding "that said 1~ill 
and first codicil were in existence at the time of decedent's death 
and have either not been found or have been lost or destroyed by 
some person other than decedent". 
All the evidence introduced at trial shows that decedent did 
not revoke his will. Evidence that it cannot be found, which formed the 
entire basis of objectors' and respondents' case, does not prove that it 
is not in existence or that it was revoked. 
As additional evidence showing that the Will was in existence 
at the time of decedent's death, and explaining why it has not been 
found, is the fact that Bertha and Helen rifled through the documents in 
the cupboard. Besides the two brothers, one of whom was in the house 
with Bertha and Helen, they were the only ones who had a motive for 
wanting the will destroyed. Spending as much time as they did at a 
place in the house where the decedent was known to have kept some of his 
papers and documents, afforded them ample opportunity to find and con-
fiscate the will. 
Also, when asked at trial about the above incident, both Helen 
and Bertha were very equivocal and evasive, and even contradictory in 
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recounting what actually occurred. Such suspicious circumstances 
indicate that some impropriety may well have occurred. Therefore, 
pursuant to the above-cited cases, the court should have found that 
the will was in existence at testator's death and either that it just 
has not been found, or that it was destroyed subsequent to testator's 
death by parties interested in the decedent's intestacy. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE GREAT WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
WITH SIMILAR STATUTES HOLDS THAT LEGAL EXISTENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SATISFY THE INTENT OF THIS KIND OF STATUTE. 
The statute, Section 75-3-26, U.C.A., requires a will to be 
"in existence at the time of the death of the testator" to be admitted 
to probate. The court found that the section requires that the physical 
existence of the document at the time of death be shown, and since in 
this case the will has not been found, it was therefore not in existence. 
Assuming arguendo, however, that the paper has been destroyed, a fact 
unsupported by any evidence, petitioners and appellants contend that the 
purpose of the section is fulfilled only if the section is construed to 
require legal existence; that is, that it be unrevoked by the testator. 
Proof of non-revocation is all that should be required; for as was 
said in Frandsen, supra, at p. 363: "The purpose of the statute is to 
prevent spurious wills from being proved." Once non-revocation is 
shown, there is no reason not to probate the will, even though the 
original document is lost. Where there is no question that the will 
being offered for probate is genuine, and "[I]f the whole purpose of 
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the statute can be subserved, the court, in furtherance of justice, may 
well give its provisions a fair and even a liberal construction rather 
than a narrow and strict one, when to do that would be unfair or unjust.' 
Frandsen, supra at 364. The court proceeded to follow its own counsel 
holding that, as used in the statute, "death" meant "legal death for 
purposes of making a will" and not "physical death". There is no reason 
to strictly construe the term "in existence" as the trial court did in 
this case, when to do so would circumvent the stated and proven intention 
of the testator in an unfair and unjust manner. 
The only possible reason for requiring that the paper's physica1 
existence be shown is to prevent fraud. The terms of the will can just 
as easily be proved by an exact copy as by the original copy itself. 
Where the will is unrevoked, a copy shows the testator's intent just as 
readily as the missing original. And if testator's intent is clearly 
shown, and it is clearly shown that he did not revoke the will, there 
is no fraud. Thus, no reason exists to exclude the unrevoked will (see 
In re Fox' Will, 174 N.E.2d 499, 505 (N.Y. 1961 }). 
On the other hand, to deny probate to an unrevoked though 
~issing will, would totally frustrate the intent of the testator. It 
would also deny him the right to dispose of his property as he deemed 
best. 
At the trial, the court required that the will's physical 
existence be shown. However, a reading of the cases of other j uri sdi ctio~ i 
reveals that by far, the most common construction of "in existence" is I 
legal and not physical existence. 
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Listed in alphabetical order, the construction of similar 
statutes in other jurisdictions is as follows: 
ARKANSAS. 
Arkansas Statutes Sec. 60-304 requires that the will be shown 
to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator." 
In construing the statute, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Garrett v. 
Butler, 317 S.W.2d 283 (Ark. 1958) noted that even though the will could 
not be found, nothing had changed to alter the disposition of the 
property as provided by the wi 11. Al so, there was ". . . a total 
absence of any testimony he tried or wanted to make any change in or 
revoke his will." The court then stated: 
The vital question with which we are concerned of course is 
whether or not the will was revoked. We are confronted with no 
proof but with a presumption only that it was revoked. We think 
the testimony and attending circumstances are sufficient to 
overcome that presumption. Garrett, supra at 285 (emphasis 
added). 
The unrevoked though missing will was thus admitted to probate. 
CALIFORNIA 
California's Probate Code Section 350 is almost identical to 
Utah's Section. In interpreting their section, the intermediate appellate 
courts of California have gone both ways. 
However, the Supreme Court in deciding two cases has held 
that legal existence is all that is required. 
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In In re Moramarco's Estate, 194 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1948) the 
evidence adduced at trial showed only that the will could not be found. 
If there is no evidence pointing toward destruction of the will, 
other than the presumption previously mentioned, and there is 
circumstantial evidence of substance tending to prove that it 
was not destroyed, we are satisfied that the court may properly 
find that it was in existence at the date of testator's death. 
The only other California Supreme Court case in point, In re 
Bristol's Estate, 143 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1943) held "existence" to mean 
"unrevoked". In that case, it was proved that the will had been duly 
executed, but had never been seen by anyone after testator's death. 
The only evidence showing revocation was the presumption of revocation, 
based on the fact that the will could not be found. The Supreme Court, 
after citing testimony from the trial, stated: 
The above-quoted testimony obviously depicts a state of mind of 
the testator which the trial judge could well have concluded 
was consistent only with the lost codicil's being, in [testator's] 
belief, unrevoked and potentially operative. Bristol, supra at 
693 (emphasis added). 
Of the three California appeallate court decisions on the 
subject, one has held that legal existence was sufficient, while two 
have held that physical existence was necessary. 
In In re Flood's Estate, 119 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1941), the will 
could not be shown to exist after the death of the decedent. Nor was 
there any evidence rebutting the presumption of revocation. The court 
posed the question it would have to answer as " ... whether there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to justify a finding that the will was 
lost, and that it was in existence at the time of death. This may sound 
contradictory, but it is obvious the words 'in existence' import 'unrEv0~-
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Flood, supra at 169 (emphasis added). Finding there was insufficient 
evidence to overcome the presumption of revocation, the court held that 
the presumption prevailed and that the will had been revoked. It was on 
that ground that the will was denied probate and not that the paper was 
no longer in physical existence. 
The two cases holding that physical existence is required are 
In re Estate of Strickman, 55 Cal.Rptr. 606 (1966) and In re Estate of 
Lane, 86 Cal.Rptr. 620 (1970). In the Strickman case, the testatrix had 
told a friend that she wanted to change a number of provisions on page 
three of her will. The friend typed the changes on another piece of 
paper. At the testatrix' death, the first two pages of the original 
will, along with the newly typed, but unexecuted, third page, were found 
together in the testatrix' safe deposit box. Since the original third 
page could not be found, the presumption of revocation arose. However, 
in that case, no evidence was offered to rebut the presumption of 
revocation. From the evidence it was clear that the intent of the 
testatrix was to revoke that portion of her will. The court held, and 
rightfully so, that because the third page was no longer in physical 
existence and was not where it should have been, it had been revoked. 
But it is also important to note that in that case, the testatrix had 
expressed dissatisfaction with the provisions of the will and had 
actually had a friend type a new page. In the instant case, the testator 
never expressed any dissatisfaction with the disposition of his estate. 
Only when his brother died did he change the executors. Additionally, 
in Strickman there was no evidence overcoming the presumption of 
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revocation; whereas, in the instant case, it was conclusively shown 
that the testator had no intent to revoke his will, and therefore there 
was no revocation. Thus, the court in Strickman was not faced with 
the circumstances present in this case, and therefore its holding and 
rationale do not apply to this case. 
In In re Estate of Lane, 86 Cal.Rptr. 620 (1970), the second 
California case requiring physical existence, the question was not one 
of physical versus legal existence. Rather, it was a question of 
standing to contest the probate of a subsequent will. In order to show 
that standing, the contestant had to show the will was "in existence" 
at the testator's death and that they were takers under the will. 
Since there had been no evidence introduced showing the will was in 
existence, either legal or physical, the court concluded that the 
contestant had no standing. In its discussion of the meaning of 
existence, the court stated: 
The word "Existence" used in the code section means "physical 
existence" rather than "legal existence". Lane, supra at 622. 
decisions: 
As authority for its holding, the court relied on the following 1 
I 
(1) Strickman, supra. See above discussion. 
{2) In Estate of Kidder, 6 P. 326 (Cal. 1885) the evidence 
showed that the testatrix had actually destroyed the will herself by 
throwing it into the fire. There was no evidence showing she did not 
I 
intend to revoke it. Thus, while the will was not in physical existence, I 
I 
it was also not in legal existence. Its probate was thus properly denied i ! 
under either interpretation. 
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(3) In Estate of Johnson, 66 P. 845 (Cal. 1901) the evidence 
showed that the testator intentionally destroyed the will, thinking 
that a subsequent will would be sufficient, when in fact it was not. 
Since testator had destroyed his will with the intent to revoke, the 
will was not in legal or physical existence. 
(4) Finally, in Estate of Patterson, 102 P. 941 (Cal. 1909) 
the will in question was in testator's house when it burned down. The 
testator had time to execute a new will, but failed to do so. The court 
denied probate on the ground that the will was not in physical existence 
at the testator's death. An important fact supporting that result is 
that the testator, while having the opportunity to execute a new will, 
never did so. The court thusly denied probate. 
In all the above cases, it is important to note that the 
will had actually been physically destroyed and in most cases by the 
testator or testatrix. In the instant case, there is no evidence that 
the will was actually destroyed; there is merely an inference that it 
might have been. Also, there is substantial evidence that testator 
never intended to revoke his will, thus rebutting the presumption of 
revocation. In the above cases no evidence was introduced rebutting the 
presumption of revocation. It is apparent, therefore, that the 
California cases requiring physical existence are inapplicable to the 
instant case. On the other hand, the facts of Moramarco are on all 
fours with the facts of the instant case, and would be controlling if 
this case were brought in California. 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
COLORADO 
Colorado's lost will statute was formerly Sec. 5205. In 1953, 
the section number was changed to Sec. 152-5-29. In 1973, the codes 
were revised and apparently the lost will section was deleted. As it 
stood prior to deletion, the section was substantially the same as Utah's. 
The first case dealing with the section was In re Eder's Esta~. 
29 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1933). No evidence showed the physical existence of 
the paper subsequent to the testator's death. There was also no evidence 
that the will had been revoked. In construing the term "in existence" 
the court said: 
A will must be reduced to writing (citing the applicable code 
section) but its continued existence as a will should not be held 
to depend at all events upon the production and exhibition of the 
writing ... [A] will, once validly made and published, remains 
a will, although the writing, the best evidence of it, in the 
absence of intent to revoke, be lost or destroyed. Thus con-
sidered, the word "existence" in our statute has to do with the 
will of the testator as manifested by his intent that the terms 
of the writing shall be carried out on his death. Eder, supra 
at 634 (emphasis added). 
The most recent Colorado decision on the issue in question 
is In re Estate of Enz, 515 P.2d 1133 (Colo. 1973) where following 
decedent's death, the original will was not found. In holding declara-
tions of the decedent admissible to show non-revocation of the will, 
the court stated: 
However, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence of decedent's 
declaration tending to prove decedent believed the will to be in 
existence unrevoked. Enz, supra at ll36, 1137 (emphasis added). 
Finally, In re Varnum's Estate, 357 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1960) 
dealt with Colorado's lost will statute. While it was not shown whether ' 
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or not the will was revoked, the basis for the court's holding was not 
the non-existence of the will, but rather because the terms of the 
document could not be adequately proved. This is clear from the words 
which the court emphasized in italics. Additionally, the court cited 
Eder, supra as authority and in no way indicated disapproval with Eder's 
holding. Also, subsequent to Varnum in the Enz decision, the court 
equated "in existence" with non-revocation. Indisputably, then, the 
Colorado position is in line with the great weight of authority, to-wit, 
proof of non-revocation proves existence. 
IDAHO 
Prior to 1971 when the lost will section was repealed, Idaho's 
lost will statute was the same as Utah's and was contained in Idaho 
Code Sec. 15-231. Three cases were decided under that section, only 
one of which was concerned with whether the will was "in existence" 
at the time of the testator's death. That case, In re Kilgore's Estate, 
387 P.2d 16 (Id. 1963) made two trips to the Supreme Court. The first 
was in 1962 (see 370 P.2d 512) when the main issue litigated was the 
competency of a beneficiary to testify to the contents of the will. 
Holding such a witness competent, the Supreme Court sent the case back 
to the trial court for retrial. After the second trial, the case went 
back to the Supreme Court (Kilgore, 387 P.2d 16). The question posed 
by the trial court setting forth the requirements of the code section 
were: 
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1. Was the will in question revoked by [decedent] prior 
to his death? 
2. If the will was not revoked, have the contents been 
proved as provided by law? Kilgore, supra at 16. 
Finding that there had not been sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's 
finding on the first question, i.e., revocation, the court remanded 
stating: "The case is remanded for a new trial limited to the question 
of revocation." Kilgore, supra at 21 (emphasis added). 
As is apparent from a reading of the Kilgore case, Idaho's 
definition of "in existence" is legal existence, i.e., whether or not 
the will has been revoked. 
ILLINOIS 
Illinois does not have a lost will statute. However, the 
Supreme Court was faced with a case where the physical existence of the 
will could not be shown in In re Morgan's Estate, 59 N.E. 800, 801 
(Ill. 1945). The court held that: 
The test applied in the cases which have been before this court, 
is whether the evidence shows that it is unlikely that the testa-
tor destroyed his will. To determine this, evidence of the 
statements made by the testator a short time before his death 
is competent. As was held in Matter of Page, 8 N.E. 852 (Ill. 1886),, 
it is not necessary that the court be able to determine what 
happened to a will if there is evidence that indicates it was 
not revoked or cancelled by the testator. (Emphasis added.) 
INDIANA 
Indiana's lost will statute is contained in Sec. 29-1-7-5. 
In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 115 N.E. 582 (Ind. 1917), one of the few cases 
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... 
The "continued existence of the will" does not mean its continued 
physical existence. A will may continue to exist though the 
paper it was written upon is destroyed. 
MINNESOTA 
Initially, Minnesota's lost will statute was the same as Utah's. 
Under that section, the leading case the court decided was In re Havel's 
Estate, 194 N.\oi. 633 (Minn. 1923). The will was not shown to be in 
physical existence at the time of the testator's death. The court posed 
the question as follows: "Does this section require physical existence 
of the document at the moment of the testator's death; or is existence 
in contemplation of law, without the coexistence of the paper and writing 
all that is demanded?" The court answered the question thusly: The section 
" ... is construed not to require physical existence of the will at 
the time of the testator's death in order to permit its probate, in the 
manner indicated, as a lost or destroyed will. Its continued legal effect, 
unrevoked is all that is required." Havel's Estate, supra at 634 {emphasis 
added). 
Recognizing that injustice had often resulted from some courts 
requiring physical existence, the legislature changed the statute to 
provide in pertinent part that no lost will ". shall be established 
unless it is proved to have remained unrevoked M.S.A. Sec. 
525.261. 
Minnesota, in 1975, changed its entire probate code and deleted 
the code section altogether. Thus, there is no lost will statute today 
in Minnesota. 
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decided under the statute, the Supreme Court did not decide whether 
physical or legal existence would be required. The court simply said, 
"The record would have to show that the trial court found as a fact that 
the alleged will was in existence at the time of the death of the 
testator." Fl etcher, supra at 583. But the court did not say what it 
meant by "in existence". No other case from Indiana has been reported 
which bears on the issue involved herein. 
KANSAS 
The Kansas statute, Sec. 59-2228, while not using the term 
"in existence", requires that the original will be shown to have been 
lost after the death of the testator. In Chruchill v. Dill, 68 P.2d 337 
(Kan. 1937) it could not be shown that the will was not lost before the 
testator's death; there was no evidence as to when it was lost. The 
court held that legal existence at the testator's death was sufficient. 
"The question tried in this case was whether the will was in existence, 
or in force, at the time of the death of the testator." Churchill, 
supra at 340. The trial court found that the will was in force at the 
time of testator's death, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 
legal existence was sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the statute. 
MAINE 
The Main statute, Sec. 18-103, requires the "continued existencE 
of the will. In Appeal of Thompson, 96 A. 238, 239 (Me. 1915) the 
Supreme Judicial Court said: 
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MONTANA 
In 1904, Montana's lost will section read the same as Utah's. 
In re Colbert's Estate, 78 P. 871 (Mont. 1904) the Supreme Court, in 
construing the statute said: 
[T]he statute is to the effect that the proponent of a lost will 
must prove either that the will was actually in existence at the 
time of the testator's death, or that it is in existence in 
contemplation of law. If it was fraudulently destroyed in his 
lifetime it is still so in existence. If appellant cannot prove 
that the will was in existence, either actually or in contemplation 
of the law, at the time [decedent] died, it follows that his case 
cannot stand. Colbert, supra at 974 (emphasis added). 
Finding, however, that the presumption of revocation was not overcome, 
the court denied probate. It is patently clear that had such presumption 
been overcome, the will would have been in existence "in contemplation 
of law" and that the court would have admitted it to probate. 
In 1947, the Montana Codes were re.vised with the concomitant 
renumbering of the section, but its provisions remained identical. The 
Supreme Court, in 1974, had occasion to deal with the section in a case 
factually similar to the Colbert case, supra. As in the Colbert case, 
the proponent failed to rebut the presumption of revocation. With 
respect to the existence of the will, the court said that the test was 
whether " the will was actually in existence or in existence in 
contemplation of the law at the time of deceased's death." In re 
Estate of Newman, 518 P.2d 800 at 804 (Mont. 1974). Finding the 
presumption of revocation not overcome, the court found the will not 
in physical or legal existence, and thus denied probate. 
In 1975, the Montana Probate Code was revised, and the lost 
will section was deleted. No new section was adopted which deals with 
lost wills. 
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NEVADA 
Nevada's Section 136.2402(3) is identical to Utah's lost will 
section. It has, however, not been construed by the Nevada courts. 
NEW YORK 
Prior to 1966, New York's Surrogate's Court Act Sec. 134 
was identical to Utah's Section 75-3-26. After vacillating from 
requiring physical existence in Matter of Kennedy's Will, 60 N.E. 442 
(N.Y. 1901) to requiring legal existence in Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 
653, the court of appeals, in In re Fox' Will, 174 N.E.2d 499 (N.Y. 1961) 
explicitly held that legal existence was sufficient to meet the require-
ments of the law. In that case, the decedent's will had been in Germany 
and was destroyed in a bombing raid during World War II. Upon hearing 
of the will 's destruction, the testator purportedly "orally adopted" 
the destruction. The court held that such an adoption of destruction 
was ineffective because the testator had not complied with the appli-
cable code sections, and also because no intent to revoke had ac-
companied the destruction. 
The court was then faced with the issue of whether the in-
controvertibly destroyed will was "in existence" at the testator's 
death so as to fit within the ambit of Section 143 of the Surrogate 
Court Act. The court said at page 504: 
The purpose of Section 143 is to impose on the proponent of a lost 
or destroyed will the burden of overcoming this common-law pre-
sumption of proving, that is, that the lost or destroyed will was 
not revoked by the testator during his lifetime ... In other 
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words, all that Section 143 requires is proof that the testator 
himself had not revoked the lost or destroyed will, proof that 
would overcome the common-law presumption of revocation. (Emphasis 
added.) 
As authority for its holding, the court in Fox cited Schultz, 
supra, which held: 
"[T]he wi 11 of the testator has never been legally revoked or 
cancelled" and that it followed necessarily that the will was 
either "in existence at the time of the death of the testator; 
or fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator." 
In other words, the court in the Schultz case reasoned that the 
fact that the will had not been revoked by the testator necessarily 
implied compliance with the statutory requirement that the will 
either had been in existence at the time of death or had been 
"fraudulently destroyed". Fox, supra at 504. 
To drive the point home, the court further said: 
But, as is clear from an analysis of Section 143 and from a 
reading of the Schultz opinion, the design of the section is 
solely to require proof that the lost or destroyed will offered 
for probate was not destroyed by the testator animo revocandi. 
Fox, supra at 505. --
Finally, as was quoted earlier in this brief, the court in Fox 
said at page 505: "However sophisticated the reasoning may appear, to 
speak of a destroyed will which is valid and unrevoked but which may not 
be admitted to probate is legal sophistry .. 
Five years after the Fox decision, the legislature revised 
New York's lost will statute to read in pertinent part: 
A lost or destroyed will may be admitted to probate only if 
l. It is established that the will has not been revoked . 
(S.C.P. Sec. 407). 
The change is significant because it removes all doubt as to the purpose of 
the statute. Following the section, in the New York Codes, is the "Practice 
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Commentary" by John L. Goldman. Commenting on the change, Mr. Goldman 
states: 
The text of S.C.A. Sec. 143 has been changed in the present section 
so as to clarify the legislative intent that the sole question to 
be resolved by the court is whether the testator did not intend 
to revoke his will. (See comments following Sec. 1407, S.C.P.; 
emphasis added.) 
OKLAHOMA 
Oklahoma has a statute substantially the same as Utah's. No 
Oklahoma case construing the section, however, has involved a situation 
similar to that of the instant case. 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
While South Dakota has a section identical to Utah's, it has 
not been construed. 
WASHINGTON 
Washington's current statute, R.C.W. 11.20.070 is, except for 
the number, the same as its predecessor, Rev. St. Sec. 1390, which proscritl 
a lost or destroyed will from being proved " unless the same shall 
be proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the 
testator." The State Supreme Court has vacillated on the meaning of 
"in existence" under the section. 
In In re Auritt's Estate, 27 P.2d 713 (Wash. 1933), the will 
of the decedent had never been found. The presumption of revocation 
was overcome by proof that her feelings toward the beneficiary remained 
constant from the date of execution until the date of death; this was 
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-shmvn by, among other things, the decedent's dee l ara ti ans prior to 
death. The court, at page 716, said: 
From a reading of the record, we can come to no other conclusion 
than that arrived at by the trial court, namely, that [the decedent] 
never revoked her will, but that it was in existence, somewhere, 
at the time of her death. (Emphasis added.) 
A careful reading of the underscored language reveals that the 
court admitted the will to probate, not on the basis of its physical 
existence, but on the basis of its legal existence. That follows from 
the fact that its physical existence could not be shown. Only its legal 
existence, i.e., non-revocation, could be shown and thus its admission 
to probate must have been on that ground. 
Notwithstanding the above authority, in In re Kerckhof's Estate, 
125 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1942), the court was faced with facts substantially 
different from those of either the instant case or those of Auritt 
decision. In Kerckhof, supra, the testator directed that his will be 
torn up and destroyed in his presence. His purpose in doing so was to 
make certain that the provisions of the will would not be effective. 
Thus it is clear that he not only destroyed his will, but also that he 
did so with the intent to revoke it. As such, it was not in physical or 
legal existence at the testator's death. The court based its holding on 
the fact that it was not physically in existence. 
When [the legislature] said that such will must be proved to have 
been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, it 
meant--just as the language plainly signifies--the physical existence 
of the written document. Kerckhof, supra at 287. 
As noted, the facts were that the will had been revoked. 
Since that is not the situation in the instant case, the holding of that 
decision is inapplicable. 
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Finally, In re Estate of Nelson, 537 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1975), 
the most recent Washington decision, reaffirms the Auritt holding, and 
indicates that legal existence is sufficient. The pertinent facts 
showed only that the will had not been revoked--not that it had not been 
destroyed. Said the court at page 769: 
The statutory requirement of proof of existence simply codifies the 
common-law presumption that a will that cannot be found was des-
troyed animo revocandi, which may be rebutted by evidence as to the 
testator's attitude of mind, as indicated by his declarations made 
between the time of executing the will and the time of his death 
... [citing Auritt, supra]. Recognizing that the fundamental 
concern is fulfillment of the testator's intent, we have in previous 
cases found evidence showing that a will was in existence at the 
time of death adequate, although it was far from ovenvhelmi ng ... 
[W]e hold that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the 
will was in existence at the time of [the decedent's] death and was 
not destroyed by her with the intent to revoke it." Nelson, supra 
at 769, 770. 
Even though the physical existence of the will could not be shown, it 
was admitted to probate because it was shown that it had not been re-
voked and therefore in legal existence. 
Clearly, then, the Washington construction of the section com-
ports with the position being urged by petitioners. The only case 
indicating otherwise, Kerckhof, supra, is not applicable because of the 
above-noted factual distinctions. 
WYOMING 
Wyoming has a statute similar to that of Utah's, but to date 
it has not been construed. 
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POINT VI. 
THAT A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED WHEN EVIDENCE WHICH COULD 
NOT BE PRODUCED AT TRIAL IS NEWLY DISCOVERED. 
Pursuant to Rule 59(4), U.R.C.P., a new trial should be 
granted when after trial there is " ... newly discovered evidence, 
material for the party making the application which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial." By 
affidavit, petitioners-appellants adduced evidence after trial which 
would have changed the trial court's holding. Denying the motion for a 
new trial was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 
The evidence which is newly discovered is that the objectors 
possibly had access to the document which cannot be found. They were 
the only ones who had a motive for wanting the will destroyed. And 
their contradictory testimony at trial, coupled with the above facts, 
indicates that a grave injustice may result if a new trial is not 
granted. 
The evidence adduced at trial showed that those who knew 
Harvard L. Wheadon well, knew he kept some of his papers and documents 
in a particular cupboard. The Shepards have stated under oath that 
Bertha and Helen went immediately to that cupboard and started rifling 
through the documents. Grant Palmer's affidavit states that Bertha and 
Helen were already rifling through those documents when he arrived. The 
slight discrepancy as to time only is not nearly as important as the 
fact that both Bertha and Helen went foraging through those documents. 
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Of import, also, is the fact that they and the decedent's two brothers 
were the only ones who would profit from the loss of the will. This, 
coupled with the fact that Bertha said the cupboard door was never open, 
Helen's equivocal and evasive initial statements that no one opened the 
cupboard, and then finally admitting that it was opened "just a little", 
and John's denial that he was ever there prior to the funeral, points 
the finger of suspicion in the direction of the objectors-respondents. 
Especially is this so in light of the disinterested testimony of Grant 
Palmer and the Shepards, wholly contradicting Bertha's, Helen's and 
John's testimony, and indicating that Bertha and Helen spent a sub-
stantial amount of time looking through documents which had come from a 
cupboard, which obviously was much more than "just a little" open. 
Furthermore, as Grant Palmer stated under oath, none of the 
three interested parties, John, Bertha or Helen, was seen outside the 
house until nearly a half hour later, when he observed Bertha enter her 
home from the direction of the decedent's home. 
As noted previously, the attorneys for petitioners-appellants 
would have been able to present this evidence at the previous trial, 
except that only at the last minute did the Shepards back down from 
their willingness to testify. 
,Because of the paucity of time, petitioners' attorneys could 
not, by reasonable diligence, have obtained similar testimony from Grant 
Palmer. Petitioners' attorneys had never been in contact with Mr. 
Palmer. They had learned of his presence on the occasion in question 
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before the trial; but at that time, the Shepards were still expected to 
testify. By the time the Shepards had completely backed out, petitioners' 
attorneys were so engrossed in the final preparation of their case-in-
chief, that reasonable diligence could not" ... have discovered and 
produced at the trial ... " the evidence contained in the affidavits. 
To be grounds for a new trial, newly-discovered evidence 
cannot be merely cumulative (U. S. v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161, 175, 13 P. 
673). The only evidence on the issue of possible destruction by Bertha 
and Helen was by Bertha, Helen and John. However, their testimony was 
equivocal, inconsistent and highly suspect. Because the Shepards re-
fused to testify, and Grant Palmer's knowledge of the matter was unknown 
to petitioners' attorneys, petitioners were unable to present any testi-
mony whatsoever on this issue. Thus, Mr. Palmer's testimony would not 
be cumulative. 
In Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 380, 57 P.2d 708 (1936), 
the plaintiff, after trial, discovered a disinterested witness who could 
shed substantial light on a vital issue. The trial court denied the 
motion, but on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, stating: 
Where disinterested testimony on the vital point in a case is very 
scant, newly discovered testimony on that point appearing from 
affidavits in support of the motion for a .new trial to be apparently 
reliable, when it appears that the movant for the new trial was not 
quilty of indiligence in failing to obtain the witness for the 
trial, and that there is no element of holding such witness in 
reserve for purposes of obtaining a new trial ... and it appears 
likely that such evidence would change the result, a new trial 
should be granted. 
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In the instant case, all the criteria for a new trial specified in 
Jensen are present. The testimony of Grant Palmer is that of a dis-
interested witness; he will gain nothing irrespective of the outcome. 
It concerns a vital issue: Possible destruction of the will by in-
terested parties--thus showing the will was in existence at the testa-
tor's death. Since Palmer was present on the day in question, his 
testimony is reliable and its reliability is strengthened by the Shepards'' 
affidavit. Petitioners' attorneys were not negligent in not obtaining 
the testimony: They did not know it existed until shortly before the 
trial when the Shepards refused to testify, and by that time it was too 
late to obtain it. Petitioners were not holding such witness in reserve 
since they did not even know what his testimony would be. And finally, 
since that testimony is material since it is disinterested and explains 
the inconsistency in the objectors' testimony, it could clearly change 
the result of the trial. This is especially true here where it now can 
be shown that the objectors may have had access to decedent's important 
papers, including his will. (See Baumgarten v. Hoffman, 9 Utah 338, 34 
P. 294 (1893); and Turner v. Stevens, 8 Utah 75, 30 P. 24 (1892).) 
In sum, the great majority of jurisdictions have held the term 
"in existence" to mean legal existence. Each of the cases holding 
otherwise, California, Indiana, New York and Washington, is factually 
distinguisable from the facts of the present case, and therefore they 
are not applicable. With the exception of Indiana, the cases from each 
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-of those jurisdictions which are factually similar to the instant case 
have construed the section to require only legal existence. There is no 
Indiana case which is factually similar. 
Si nee the overwhelming weight of authority holds that "legal 
existence" is sufficient, the petitioners-appellants urge that the Utah 
statute be construed to require a showing only of legal existence. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the purpose and intent of Section 75-3-26 Utah Code 
Annotated is to prevent spurious wills from being probated, and where 
there is evidence conclusively proving that the purported will is in 
fact the will of the testator, and that he had no intent to revoke it as 
his will, there is no justifiable reason to deny the will probate and 
thereby thwart the testator's intent. Especially is this so where, as 
here, the only thing preventing the will from being probated is a re-
buttable presumption of revocation. 
'1 CA, +.J. -c- --Da ted this r'ftt day of Se~te~ee~. 1977. 
JOHNSON, DURHAM, MOXLEY & McCULLOUGH 
By /!!JC- . 
By~ . 1.as 
1320 Continental Ban/Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-5614 
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